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substantially in the last two decades. Tracing the main regulatory
developments, this Article summarizes the author’s theoretical and empirical
findings on the effects of changes in private investment fund regulation from
2006 to 2016, assessing the regulatory implications of the failure of Long–
Term Capital Management L.P. in 1998 and the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.
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blockchain technology and smart contracts.
Key Words: Private Investment Funds, Hedge Funds, Private Equity,
Long Term Capital Management, Regulation, Dodd-Frank Act, PFIARA,
Compliance, Blockchain, Distributed Ledger Technology, Artificial
Intelligence, Machine Learning, Data Science, Data Scientists, Meta Models,
Innovation, Entrepreneur, Startup, Big Data, Diversification, Optimization,
Efficiency
JEL Categories: K20, K23, K32, L43, L5, O31, O32

* © 2017 Wulf A. Kaal. Associate Professor, University of Saint Thomas School of Law and
Director of the Private Investment Funds Institute, Minneapolis. The author sincerely thanks
the many industry representatives who provided comments and feedback on initial drafts of
this article. He is also grateful for outstanding research assistance from librarian Ann Bateson.

579

KAAL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

580

10/1/2018 3:22 PM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 20.3

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 580
I. INITIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES .... 583
A. Reliance on Exemptions ................................................. 583
B. Evolution of the Investment Advisers Act Exemption ... 585
II. FAILURE OF LONG–TERM-CAPITAL MANAGEMENT ................ 587
A. Critique of Regulatory Proposals ................................... 588
B. Indirect Regulation ......................................................... 589
III. DODD-FRANK-ACT.................................................................. 591
A. Implications of Title IV—Empirical Evidence............... 593
B. Systemic Risk ................................................................. 608
C. Private Fund Investor Due Diligence ............................. 611
IV. CONFLUENCE OF PRIVATE AND MUTUAL FUNDS ................... 613
A. Evidence ......................................................................... 615
B. Implications .................................................................... 616
V.
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE
INVESTMENT FUNDS .............................................................. 619
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK ............................................................ 621
INTRODUCTION
Private investment fund regulation in the United States and the
corresponding scholarship evolved as the private investment fund industry
advanced from a niche market participant in the early 1950s to a major
industry operating in international financial markets today. The available
scholarship traces the main developments in private investment fund
regulation in three major phases beginning in 1998. The post 1998 phases
in regulatory developments of private investment funds are distinguishable
from the incremental changes in the applicable SEC rulemaking and
regulatory developments from the 1950s to 1998 because of the heightened
intensity of regulatory supervision post 1998.
In phase one, domestic and international regulatory bodies examined
ways to improve the existing regulatory framework pertaining to private
investment funds in the aftermath of the 1998 failure of Long–Term Capital
Management, L.P. (“LTCM”), the largest hedge fund failure to date.1 Phase

1. See WULF A. KAAL, HEDGE FUND REGULATION BY BANKING SUPERVISION: A
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, 58–72, 133–71 (European Univ. Studies, Ser. V.,
Econ. & Mgmt., Vol. 3174 2006) [hereinafter Kaal, BANKING SUPERVISION] (summarizing the
legislative and regulatory measures in response to LTCM in the United Kingdom, France, and
the United States and evaluating the proposals for improvements of the then existing
regulatory framework for private investment funds through various domestic and international
regulatory bodies and industry groups).

KAAL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

PRIVATE INVESTMENT FUND REGULATION

10/1/2018 3:22 PM

581

two, starting in 2010 with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act2 (“Title IV” or
“Dodd-Frank”), is dominated by the increasing regulatory scrutiny of the
private investment fund industry under the Dodd-Frank Act and the
associated rules and Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
guidance. The SEC continues to refine and expand the regulatory landscape
for the private fund industry in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act and the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”),3 and it continues to
amend rules and SEC reporting forms that apply to the private fund industry.4
Phase three is characterized by the emerging evidence of the confluence of
prior separate asset classes5 in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act and other
long-term implications of the regulatory overhaul under the Dodd-Frank Act,
such as the dilution of the public/private distinction in federal securities
regulation.
This Article traces the main developments in each phase of private
investment fund regulation from 1998 to 2016 and examines the author’s
core scholarly contributions and empirical findings pertaining to each phase.
The author’s scholarly contributions in phase one focused on evaluating the
proposed remedies6 for private fund investment regulation and suggesting
alternatives.7 Scholarship in phase two summarized the regulatory evolution

2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, §§ 401-416, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570–1580 (2010); id. at § 402 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2 (2012)) (regulating private investment funds following the financial crisis of
2008); id. at § 403 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3) (West 2009 & Supp. 2016).
3. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126
Stat. 306, 313-14 (2012).
4. See Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry:
Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2015, 71 BUS. LAW. 1151, 1170-72 (2016)
(manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479 [https://perma.cc/5EZX-VSX9] [hereinafter
Kaal, Evolution] (outlining notable trends and regulatory developments in the private fund
industry in the aftermath of Dodd-Frank).
5. See Wulf A. Kaal, Confluence of Private and Mutual Funds, in HANDBOOK ON
MUTUAL FUNDS 1, 5 (manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715083 [https://perma.cc/J9G6CDVK] [hereinafter Kaal, Confluence] (describing the effects of the proliferation of
nontraditional asset classes).
6. See Kaal, BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, 44 VANDERBILT J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 389 (Apr. 9, 2011) (manuscript) (on file with the Social Science Research
Network) [hereinafter Kaal, Basel III] (suggesting banking supervision via Basel III to remedy
hedge funds’ vast exposure to complex derivatives products and associated risks that were
insufficiently addressed by the then existing regulatory framework); Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge
Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 581, 584 (2009) (manuscript), (on file with the Social Science Research Network)
(exploring the issues created by valuation problems, and suggesting regulatory solutions);
Kaal, BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 1 (suggesting banking supervision as a promising
indirect tool to improve lacking regulatory oversight of private funds).
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of the private fund industry8 and focused particularly on the evaluation of the
effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on that industry.9 Scholarship in phase two
also analyzed the shifting evaluation of the possible systemic risk posed by
the private fund industry10 and pertinent developments in private investment
fund investor due diligence.11 Scholarship in phase three evaluated the
implications of the emerging evidence of the confluence of prior separate
asset classes12 in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act and other long-term
8. See Wulf A. Kaal & Dale A. Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the
United States, in HANDBOOK ON HEDGE FUNDS, (Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No.
326 & Univ. of St. Thomas (Minn.) Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 16-05, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974 [https://perma.cc/2D8P-B9JP]
(examining the history and evolution of private fund adviser regulation).
9. See generally Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the DoddFrank Act, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 243, 245 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377
[https://perma.cc/2QZD-7NQY] [hereinafter Kaal, Registration] (explaining how regulation
worked to counteract fraud corresponding to increased hedge fund access); Kaal, Evolution,
supra note 4; Wulf A. Kaal, What Drives Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Costs for Private
Funds? J. ALTERNATIVE INV., 1, 8 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2629386 [https://perma.c
c/HW3T-QS7W] [hereinafter Kaal, Compliance Costs] (evaluating which factors impact
Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs); Wulf A. Kaal, The Effect of Private Fund Disclosures
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 9 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 1, 9 (2015) (demonstrating
that while the overall effect of private disclosures on the industry is moderate, there are still
improvements to be made), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306 [https://perma.cc/HS86DCZD] [hereinafter Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures]; Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, & Sandra
Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance? – Evidence from 2010–
2015 (July 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) http://ssrn.com/abstract=2629347
[https://perma.cc/TMM8-MWZE] (estimating the impact of private fund adviser registration
and disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act on private fund performance); Wulf
A. Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 195, 197 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2348463 [https://perma.cc/48U7-MBQJ]
[hereinafter Kaal, Bankruptcy] (analyzing the effect of disclosure requirements on hedge fund
investors in bankruptcy proceedings).
10. See Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7; Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Krause, Hedge Funds
and Systemic Risk, in HANDBOOK ON HEDGE FUNDS (manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2
748096 [https://perma.cc/43DK-U2KW] (explaining the shifting literature on hedge funds’
systemic risk after Dodd-Frank); Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds After the
Dodd-Frank Act, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 163, 169-70 (2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008 [https://perma.cc/YE58-UVDW] [hereinafter Kaal,
Systemic Risk] (asserting that private funds create both a direct and indirect systemic risk);
Kaal, Bankruptcy, supra note 9, at 199 (outlining SEC systemic risk disclosure requirements
meant to eliminate risks posed by hedge funds).
11. See Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence –Evidence from 1995 to
2015, REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 1, 6-7, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718 [https://perma.cc/NS
T4-AUUE] [hereinafter Kaal, Due Diligence] (describing the increasing rigor of investor due
diligence in response to the financial crisis of 2008-09 and other associated crises).
12. See Kaal, Confluence, supra note 5; Wulf A. Kaal & Bentley J. Anderson, Uncons
trained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection, REV. BANKING & FIN. L. (manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729 [https://perma.cc/TV7N-AZ5T] [hereinafter Kaal &
Anderson, Protection] (exploring the protection necessary to address issues from the growth
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implications of the regulatory overhaul under the Dodd-Frank-Act, such as
the dilution of the public/private distinction in federal securities regulation.13
This Article has four main parts. After an introduction to the initial
structure of private investment fund regulation in Part II that later forms the
basis for distinguishing the intensity of regulatory change in each of the three
phases, Part III begins with a discussion of regulatory changes in phase one
and the implications of LTCM. Part IV emphasizes the examination of
regulatory changes in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act, its effects on the
private investment fund industry, systemic risk implications and changes in
the assessment of private funds’ systemic risk in the aftermath of the DoddFrank Act, and new findings in the context of private fund investor due
diligence. Finally, Part V examines the evidence on the confluence of
hitherto separate asset classes, especially the evidence pertaining to the
confluence of private and mutual funds. Part V also examines the
implications of confluence of assets classes for the public/private distinction
in federal securities regulation. Part VI examines the implications of private
fund managers’ use of blockchain technology and the associated innovation
trends in the private investment fund industry. Part VII concludes.
I.

INITIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES

Private investment funds in the United States began operations as
privately held and privately managed investment funds that were
unregistered and exempt from federal securities regulation.14
A. Reliance on Exemptions
In the early 1950s, organizers of private investment funds designed the
funds to be exempt from the registration requirements of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (private investment funds are not mutual funds), the
registration requirements of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (private
fund advisers are not classified as public investment advisers), the public
offering registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (“33 Act”)
(no public offering is required), and the periodic reporting requirements of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“34 Act”) (private investment funds

of the hedge fund industry relative to alternative asset classes).
13. See generally Kaal, Confluence, supra note 5; Kaal & Anderson, Protection, supra
note 12.
14. Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 8, at 1–2 (“The originators of the early funds designed
the funds to maximize their freedom to employ complex trading strategies by minimizing their
exposure to regulation under various federal statutes. Characteristics of early hedge funds
included their ability to remain unregistered and exempt from federal securities regulation.”).
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are not publicly traded companies).15 Private investment funds also avoid
classification as financial market intermediaries that are specifically
regulated by federal legislation, including underwriters, market makers,
broker-dealers, banks, or investment subsidiaries of operating companies.
By having fewer than 500 investors, private investment funds also generally
avoid the periodic reporting obligations of section 12 of the Exchange Act
and SEC Rule 12g-1.
Private investment funds traditionally also relied on the “private
offerings” exemption under the 33 Act and the “safe harbor” provision in
Rule 506 of Regulation D. Reliance on these exemptions allows private
investment funds to market themselves only to accredited investors, who are
institutional investors, insiders, or natural persons with a net worth of over
$1 million or income of over $200,000 for each of the last two years.16
Private investment funds using Rule 506 could not use any form of general
solicitation or general advertising. The SEC applied a pre-existing,
substantive relationship test when deciding that the general solicitation rule
had not been violated. The traditional restrictions in Rule 506 have been
relaxed under the JOBS Act.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 contains the most important
regulatory exemption for private investment funds. Private investment funds
rely on one of two statutory exclusions in the definition of an investment
company. Either they have fewer than 100 investors or their investors are
qualified purchasers.17 A hedge fund that qualifies for one of these statutory
exclusions may use investment techniques, such as shorting, among others,
that are prohibited for registered investment companies.
Through the structuring of their operations, private investment funds
can also avoid additional otherwise applicable regulations. Private
investment funds avoid regulation under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”) by limiting the ownership interest of any employee
benefit plan to less than 25% of the fund. Private investment funds also
typically avoid the regulation of “commodity pools” by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). New CFTC rules exempt pools that
sell only to sophisticated participants, “accredited investors” under
Regulation D, or “qualified purchasers” under the Investment Company Act.
Despite the broad application of exemptions and avoidance of certain
rules by way of structuring operations, private investment funds are still
subject to the general legal framework applicable to financial institutions.
Such regulations include the antifraud provisions of the 33 and 34 Acts, state
15. Id. at 7.
16. Id. at 5.
17. “Qualified purchasers” refers to individuals who own more than $5 million in
investments or companies with more than $25 million in investments. Id. at 6.
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law prohibitions against investor fraud, insider trading prohibition under
Rule 10b-5, and applicable banking laws restricting the activities of private
investment fund lenders.18
B. Evolution of the Investment Advisers Act Exemption
The controversial nature and evolution of the registration exemptions
and safe harbor under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 underscore their
policy relevance. The registration exemptions and safe harbor under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the applicable SEC guidance have
traditionally allowed advisers to private investment funds to avoid
registration as investment advisers with the SEC.19 Until the passing of the
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, the safe harbor allowed investment advisers to
private investment funds to manage large amounts of securities indirectly for
several hundreds of investors in several funds.20 Under the safe harbor,
investment advisers to private investment funds were able to count a legal
organization as a single client, provided the investment advice was based on
the objectives of the legal organization, rather than the individual investment
objectives of any owners of the legal organization.
The controversy over private fund adviser registration requirements
started in 1969. Because of private investment funds’ alleged involvement
and impact on the 1969 bear market, the SEC started to consider
opportunities to increase the regulatory scrutiny of the industry. While the
SEC initially opined that hedge funds were “dealers” in securities, which
could require registration under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,21
its guidance in the form of no-action letters continued to support the private
fund industry in determining how to count clients to stay exempt from
securities regulation until 1985.
Finally, in 1985, in an attempt to clarify the no-action letter guidance
and provide private investment fund advisers with greater certainty in
determining when they might rely on the safe harbor, the SEC adopted the
investment adviser registration safe harbor in Rule 203(b)(3) under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.22 The safe harbor allowed a limited
partnership, rather than each of its limited partners, to be counted as a
“client” of a general partner acting as investment adviser to the partnership.
18. See id. at 7 (pointing out the SEC’s interest in bringing hedge funds under its
regulatory authority).
19. Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7, at 412–14.
20. Id. at 414; Kaal, Registration, supra note 9, at 256-57; Kaal & Oesterle, supra note
8 at 7–8.
21. Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 8 at 7.
22. Kaal, Basel III, supra note 77, at 412–14; Kaal, Registration, supra note 9, at 25657; Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 8 at 7–9.
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The SEC reasoned that if an investment adviser manages an investment pool
on the basis of the investment objectives of its participants, the entire pool
should be viewed as the adviser’s client, rather than each participant.23
In December 2004, in an unprecedented politically-motivated reversal
of existing safe harbor rulemaking, the SEC, using its rulemaking authority
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, issued a final rule that required
the overwhelming majority of previously unregistered private investment
fund advisers to register with the SEC, giving it enhanced oversight over the
industry.24 Hedge fund advisers strongly opposed this controversial rule.25
Without the private adviser exemption and as newly registered advisers,
private investment fund advisers were subject to SEC inspections and
bookkeeping and record keeping requirements. Private investment funds
were now faced with disclosure requirements and code of ethics
requirements resulting in substantially higher legal fees. Registration also
allowed the SEC to screen private investment fund advisers for prior
convictions or other professional misconduct.
The registration requirement precipitated substantial opposition by the
hedge fund industry. Eventually, in July 2006, the D.C. Circuit in Goldstein
v. SEC vacated the hedge fund rule as an instance of arbitrary rulemaking by
the SEC.26 Because the term “client” had not otherwise been defined in the
Investment Advisers Act, the SEC had no authority to determine the meaning
of the term. Most hedge fund advisers who had registered under the
registration rule deregistered.27 After the Goldstein decision, the SEC
proposed additional accredited investor standards under Regulation D and
dramatically expanded antifraud protection for investors.
23. Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 8 at 8 (“The SEC broadened the scope of the rule in
1997 by including other entities used by investment advisers to pool client assets. Although
the 1985 Rule permitted advisers to count each partnership, trust, or corporation as a single
client, the 1997 Rule expanded the rule to cover other legal entities. Specifically, investment
advisers could count a legal organization as a single client provided the investment advice
was based on the objectives of the legal organization rather than the individual investment
objectives of any owners of the legal organization. This safe harbor allowed investment
advisers to manage large amounts of securities indirectly for several hundreds of investors in
several hedge funds.”).
24. See id. at 9 (providing that the SEC’s rule was motivated to increase information on
hedge fund advisers, deter fraud, and improve compliance due to the growth of the hedge fund
industry, increased hedge fund risk, and financial loss to investors from fraudulent activity by
advisers).
25. See Kaal, Registration, supra note 9, at 244–45, 249, 258–61 (stating that 91 of the
124 letters submitted to the SEC regarding the rule were against the proposal); Kaal &
Oesterle, supra note 8 at 8–9 (explaining that advisers were subject to SEC inspections and
bookkeeping requirements without the private adviser exception).
26. Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 1156; Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7, at 414–16; Kaal,
Registration, supra note 9, at 247, 260-61; Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 8 at 9.
27. Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7, at 416, 428–29; Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 1157.
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FAILURE OF LONG-TERM-CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

The failure of LTCM was the most publicized case of a failure of a
private investment fund and the significance of a failure for the stability of
world financial markets.28 Right after the announcement of the Russian debt
moratorium in mid-August 1998, LTCM suffered losses of $1.8 billion,
bringing its loss of equity for the year to over 50%.29 Because banks and
brokers had allowed LTCM to borrow 100% of the value of its collateral
prior to the worsening of LTCM’s financial condition in 1998, LTCM’s $4.8
billion in capital dissipated quickly when the banks began to make margin
calls. In order to stay afloat, LTCM required a large capital injection.
However, because of the size of its debts, LTCM’s creditors would likely
have been pushed into insolvency if LTCM had been allowed to file for
bankruptcy. The already unstable world credit markets in 1998 would likely
have collapsed if LTCM’s creditors had liquidated their LTCM collateral to
the value of $1 trillion to recoup their costs.30 Realizing the effect of
allowing LTCM to file for bankruptcy on other market participants, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York orchestrated a bailout of LTCM with
fourteen leading investment banks committing between $100 million to $350
million each.31
LTCM’s failure and its effect on world financial markets raised
regulators’ awareness of the risks pertaining to private investment funds32
and the risk tolerance of banks, prime brokers, and other counterparties to
private investment funds.33 Because private investment funds take risks that
other financial participants and other counterparties to banks would not,
borrow massive amounts, and are willing to pay a premium for borrowing,
banks’ managements generally view private investment fund banking
relationships as desirable. However, banks overexposed themselves to
private investment fund lending, allowing LTCM and other private
investment funds to grow significantly. As counterparties to private
investment funds, such as LTCM, banks put their own existence at risk with
28. Kaal, BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 1, at 52.
29. While LTCM at the time of its collapse had around 80% of its assets under
management (AUM) in government bonds of G7 countries, it also traded on and off-exchange
derivatives in interest rates, equity products, and foreign exchange, controlling $160 billion
in stocks and bonds, $4.8 billion in capital, and derivatives with a notional value of $1 trillion.
Id. at 53–54.
30. Id. at 56–57.
31. Id. at 57. The consortium injected $3.6 billion in private equity into LTCM and
received a 90% stake in LTCM´s portfolio and operational control in return.
32. The LTCM failure illustrated the dangerous combination of high leverage, large
positions, funding illiquidity, inadequate risk management, investor redemptions, and
insufficient monitoring of fund credit quality by counterparties. Id. at 57.
33. Id. at 58–72,133-71.
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their lending practices.
A. Critique of Regulatory Proposals
Scholarly engagement with the topic of private investment fund
regulation increased markedly in the aftermath of the failure of LTCM in
1998.34 Whereas prior to the LTCM debacle the literature had mostly
evaluated the model approaches to private investment fund regulation,
including coordinated international cooperation, national direct regulation,
indirect regulation, and prudential regulation,35 post LTCM all leading
international and domestic regulatory bodies reviewed regulatory
approaches in an attempt to improve the regulatory framework for private
investment funds.36
International and domestic regulatory bodies proposed reform of the
regulatory framework for private investment in an attempt to address the
perceived regulatory shortcomings identified by the failure of LTCM. Most
of the proposals for regulatory improvements involved some of the following
elements: financial intermediaries’ risk management; risk management of
private investment funds; improvements for the role of regulators in
individual financial intermediaries with significant private investment fund
business, especially firms’ risk management; improvements in market
practices at the industry and firm levels, and improvements in transparency,
e.g., reporting and disclosure recommendations.37
Starting in 2005, this author critiqued the proposals to remedy the
regulatory framework for private investment funds post-LTCM.38 He found
that proposals involving clearer credit risk strategies and credit risk
management policies and processes for financial intermediaries were
inappropriately applied across the range of business models and lacked
concrete implementation elements. Proposals calling for credit departments
for financial intermediaries proved very costly. Increased stress tests, Value
at Risk, and Monte Carlo scenarios for financial intermediaries to private
34. Id.
35. Id. at 48-51.
36. Id. at 133-71 (summarizing and evaluating regulatory proposals issued by the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions, the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, the U.S.
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, the Counterparty Risk Management Policy
Group, the Multidisciplinary Working Group on Enhanced Disclosure, the Hedge Fund
Industry Group, the Committee on the Global Financial System, the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, and the Financial Stability Forum Working Group on Highly
Leveraged Institutions).
37. Id. at 171.
38. Id. at 171-74; Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7, at 408–10, 424–34, 436–39, 444–48,
456–62.
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investments funds necessarily use historical data and are less valuable as an
indicator of high risk sensitivity for future events.39 Proposals for increased
risk management in private investment funds may not adequately take into
account evidence on private investment funds’ performance in relative
secrecy.40 Calls for improving the role of regulators in individual financial
intermediaries with significant private investment fund business encounter
significant transaction costs. Proposals calling for improvements in closeout netting agreements for financial contracts and calls for harmonized
standard documentation across jurisdictions may encounter jurisdictional
arbitrage and national protectionism.41
B. Indirect Regulation
A core emphasis in this author’s scholarly focus post LTCM involved
banks’ lending exposure to private investment funds as an indirect means of
supervising the private investment fund industry.42 Banks are ideally
positioned to support private investment fund regulation.43 Several factors,
including the exclusivity, intensity, length, and quality of the relationship
between banks and private investment funds influence the level of control a
bank may exercise over a private investment fund.44 Some private
investment fund managers may terminate a lending relationship to avoid a
bank’s attempts to exercise control over a private investment fund.
However, because private investment funds’ dynamic trading strategies
often depend on the immediate availability of capital; and given today’s
banking environment with increased scrutiny over lending and lending
relationships, managers are unlikely to terminate a lending relationship.45
In a 2009–10 scholarly exchange between this author and Professor
Roberta Romano,46 Professor Romano pointed out that: “[private investment
39. Kaal, BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 1, at 171-74.
40. Id. at 171–74.
41. Id. at 171-74.
42. Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7; Kaal, BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 1.
43. Kaal, BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 1.
44. Id. at 217-218.
45. Id.
46. See Wulf A. Kaal & Christian Kirchner, Economics of Financial Market Regulation:
Financial Reporting Standards, Banking Regulation, and Hedge Funds, in LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 5 (Peter Nobel, Katrin Krehan & AnneCathrine Tanner eds., 2010) (discussing the importance of economic regulations on the banks
as the major players in investment); Roberta Romano, Against Financial Regulation
Harmonization: A Comment (Yale L. & Econ. Res. Paper No. 414, 2010), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1697348 [https://perma.cc/ZQ9J-LTYG] (arguing that the
move to regulate hedge funds more is misguided and that hedge funds were not the cause of
the recent financial crisis); Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7.
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funds] manage only a small proportion of the investment universe,
particularly as compared to banks’ assets and are far less leveraged than
banks.”47 European and United States legislators’ attempts at imposing
stricter rules on private investment funds, seizing on hedge funds’ alleged
impact on market stability in the 2008–09 credit crisis could, therefore, have
been misplaced.
In response, and in an attempt to show the relevance of indirect
regulation of private investment funds via increased regulatory emphasis on
banks’ lending exposure to private investment funds, this author referenced
data on hedge funds’ growing participation in managing complex financial
instruments, such as CDOs and other derivatives.48 The data suggest that
since 2000 private investment funds have steadily increased their share in
the credit derivatives market while banks’ role in the market for credit
derivatives has declined.49 The increasing role of private investment funds
in the credit derivatives market50 in combination with the failure of that
market in 2009 formed the basis for this author’s proposal to increase the
regulatory emphasis on banks’ lending exposure to private investment
funds.51
Another indirect form of private investment fund regulation, proposed
by this author, focuses on investor suitability criteria.52 After evaluating the
shortcomings of the then existing numerical wealth requirements defining
qualified investors who were then eligible for investments in private
investment funds,53 this author suggested in 2009, e.g., before the regulatory
overhaul of private investment fund regulation in Title IV of the Dodd-Frank
Act in 2010, that investor suitability standards could help address concerns
over the shortcomings of investor eligibility standards. Such proposed
investor suitability standards would require independent verification of
investors’ ability to evaluate highly complex financial products and
investment risk, rendering wealth as a proxy for sophistication redundant for
investor eligibility.54
47. Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7, at 454.
48. Id. at 454–55.
49. Id. at 455 (Table 1).
50. Id. at 455 (Table 1).
51. Id. at 448-62
52. Kaal, Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability, supra note 7.
53. Id. at 636–37 (“The numerical wealth requirements that are currently in place to
define qualified investors . . . do not take into account that even investors who would
otherwise fulfil the numerical wealth requirements do not always have the adequate level of
knowledge, understanding and sophistication that would be required for investing in highly
complex financial instruments. Recent proposals by the SEC to toughen the numeracy wealth
requirements for hedge fund investing fail to ascertain the appropriate level of sophistication
and adequate understanding of highly complex financial instruments.”).
54. Id. at 637.
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DODD-FRANK-ACT

In an unprecedented overhaul of the regulatory environment for private
investment funds advisers in the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act in effect
overruled all previous SEC rules and legal precedent on private investment
fund adviser registration exemptions.55 Dodd-Frank added a significant new
chapter in the debate on private investment fund adviser registration.56
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled the Private Fund Investment
Advisers Registration Act of 2010 (“PFIARA”). PFIARA authorizes the
SEC to bring private investment funds under regulatory supervision.57
PFIARA mandates private investment fund adviser registration to increase
record keeping and disclosure. Under PFIARA, private investment fund
advisers with more than $150 million assets under management (“AUM”)
must register as investment advisers and disclose information about their
trades and portfolios to the SEC.58 The Dodd-Frank Act also directs the SEC
to set up rules for the registration and reporting of private investment fund
managers who were previously exempt from registration.59
As part of the new rules, the SEC introduced controversial reporting
obligations in a form called Form PF (private funds).60 Form PF requires
investment managers to disclose information about themselves, the funds
they manage, and their investors.61 The unprecedented disclosures in Form
55. See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.–Error! Bookmark not defined.
and accompanying text.
56. Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7, at 410–36; Kaal, Registration, supra note 9, at 261-73;
Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 8 at 9–15; Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 1158-59.
57. Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 1157–58.
58. Id. at 1158–65. By registering private investment fund advisers, the SEC intends to
collect necessary information to curtail those who operate in the “shadows of our markets,”
prevent fraud, limit systemic risk, and provide information to investors.
59. Id. at 1157–58; Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration, supra note 9, at 249, 262.
60. Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 1159, 1163–65; Kaal, Registration, supra note 9, at
269–73.
61. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, FORM PF: REPORTING FORM FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS
TO PRIVATE FUNDS AND CERTAIN COMMODITY POOL OPERATORS AND COMMODITY TRADING
ADVISORS, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formpf.pdf [https://perma.cc/NTV8V4RC]. Form PF disclosure requirements include a breakdown of the net asset value (NAV)
that the investment manager manages, including the percentage of the reporting fund’s NAV
that was managed using high-frequency trading strategies. Form PF requires investment
advisers to disclose the five trading counterparties to which the reporting fund has the greatest
net counterparty credit exposure and the dollar amount owed to each creditor. It also requires
that the manager identify changes in market factors and their effect on the portfolio’s long
and short components as a percentage of NAV. Additional disclosures include any
information about the counterparties’ collateral and other credit support posted to the
respective reporting funds, as well as trading and clearing mechanisms subject to liquidity
constraints and the duration of those constraints. Form PF is also intended to improve the
SEC’s understanding of reporting funds’ liquidity, exposure, and assets. Accordingly, Form
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PF that made it so controversial in the industry include the disclosure of
strategies and products used by the private investment fund adviser and its
funds, performance and changes in performance, financing information, risk
metrics, counterparties and credit exposure, positions held by the investment
adviser, percent of assets traded using algorithms, and the percent of equity
and debt, among other matters.62
In light of the highly sensitive and controversial nature of these required
disclosures and the complexity of the reporting requirements, Form PF
created substantial challenges for the hedge fund industry. Arguing that the
mandatory private investment fund disclosure requirements in Form PF
could inappropriately burden the private investment fund industry, private
investment fund advisers have traditionally opposed enhanced transparency
of the funds they manage.63 While the disclosures in Form PF were private,
i.e., only the SEC and not the public had access, the industry feared that such
information could at some point in the future be made public, which would
largely eliminate private investment fund managers’ ability to make absolute
returns for their clients, as competitors would be able to reverse engineer
their strategies. Apart from concerns about publicity, the private investment
fund industry complained that many reporting provisions on Form PF used
industry terms inconsistently and many required disclosures were rather hard
to produce.64 For instance, the disclosure of counterparty credit exposure is
sensitive information that often cannot readily be determined by the
individual private investment fund managers.
In a concerted effort to enforce the Dodd-Frank Act provisions
pertaining to the private investment fund industry, the SEC increased
examinations and enforcement actions against private investment fund
PF requires investment advisers to disclose the time increments needed to liquidate a certain
percentage of the reporting fund’s portfolio, the dollar value of long and short positions in
each asset class, the value of turnover by asset class, the types of creditors and the market
value of borrowings from them, and the aggregate value of all derivative positions for each
advised fund. Finally, Form PF requires disclosure of the reporting fund’s restrictions (if any)
on investor withdrawals and redemptions and other information pertaining to investor
liquidity, such as the percentage of NAV.
62. Id. Private investment fund advisers are also required to provide confidential reports
with respect to certain information related to systemic risk, such as trading practices; trading
and investment positions; the amount of AUM; valuation policies; side letters; the use of
leverage, including off-balance sheet leverage; counterparty credit risk exposures; and other
information deemed necessary.
63. See Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 8 at 11-12 (surveying duties and costs absorbed by
investment and hedge fund advisers as a result of Form PF); Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at
1164 (discussing the sensitive and complex requirements that Form PF imposes on the hedge
fund industry).
64. See Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 1165 (discussing 2012 survey results reflecting
the challenges that hedge fund advisers faced as a result of Form PF, and noting that advisors
found reporting requirements ambiguous).
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advisers.65 In its enforcement efforts in the aftermath of the enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC emphasized the equitable allocation of expenses
among investment advisers’ portfolio funds, the allocation of investment
opportunities among private investment fund advisers’ clients, and fund
advisers’ personal investing and outside business activities.66
These enforcement trends foreshadow further intensifying regulatory
enhancements pertaining to the private investment fund industry. In light of
SEC guidance in public statements, it is reasonable for the private investment
fund industry to expect longer and more intrusive SEC examinations, further
enhanced regulations, and increased SEC enforcement actions against
private investment fund managers.67 The Department of the Treasury’s
proposed rule targeting investment advisers’ filing and reporting
requirements about money laundering, Form ADV disclosures, and the
definition of “accredited investor,” among other non-final rules in 2015,
provide a taste of possible future developments for the industry.68
A. Implications of Title IV—Empirical Evidence
Given the highly controversial nature of Title IV and the private
investment fund industry’s claims pertaining to its detrimental effect on the
industry, this author examined the impact of Title IV in several empirical
studies.69
1. Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act
In the first survey study70 conducted right before the registration
effective date under Title IV, March 30, 2012, this author and a team of four
research assistants contacted a population of 1,267 private fund advisers who
65. Id. at 1173-76.
66. Id. For example, significant enforcement actions against private funds from 2012 to
2015 include undisclosed conflicts of interest, actions for misallocation of expenses, and
inflating the values of certain illiquid assets that hedge funds and private funds hold. SEC
enforcement actions included enforcement of Rule 206(4)-7, which requires funds to adopt,
implement, and annually review compliance policies. Moreover, the SEC settled charges with
private investment managers who received accelerated portfolio company monitoring fees
from sales and initial public offerings (IPOs) of portfolio companies and who failed to disclose
conflicts arising from the manager’s conversion of portfolio company monitoring fees that
could have partially been offset.
67. Id. at 1176.
68. Id.
69. Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4; Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years
After the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 624 (2016)
[hereinafter Private Fund Industry]; Kaal, Registration, supra note 9.
70. Kaal, Registration, supra note 9, at 249.
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registered with the SEC before the registration effective date. The author
contacted the entire population via fax, an electronic survey via email, and
phone interviews. Respondents (n=94) answered questions designed to
evaluate the long-term effects of reporting and disclosure rules on private
funds and the private fund industry.71 The survey questions assessed
strategic responses of the hedge fund industry to Title IV, investigated the
possible long-term effects of hedge fund registration, quantified compliance
costs, assessed compliance measures, investigated the implications of
disclosure requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act pertaining to hedge funds,
evaluated the effect of the regulatory regime on AUM, and assessed the
effect of the regulatory regime on profitability.
The results reported in this study suggested that the Dodd-Frank Act
registration and disclosure requirements and the SEC’s implementation of
these requirements created several areas of concern for the hedge fund
industry.72 Despite these concerns, the hedge fund industry appeared to be
only moderately affected and seems to be adapting well to the regulatory
environment after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.73
More specifically, this first survey study shows that 46.34% of those
who responded indicated that the Dodd-Frank registration and disclosure
rules created higher costs that affected the funds they managed, while
78.26% of respondents stated that the profits of their investment
management company were affected.74 According to 87.50% of the
respondents, the profits of their investment companies were affected by
increased costs as a result of the registration and reporting requirements. A
majority of respondents engaged in the following activities: (1) outsourced
compliance work, (2) hired additional counsel, (3) instituted new recordkeeping policies, (3) hired additional staff, (4) changed marketing materials,
and (5) changed communications with investors. A minority of respondents
changed their funds’ legal structures in response to the registration and
disclosure requirements.
Despite the concerns identified in the first study, the hedge fund
industry appeared at the time of the study to be only moderately affected by
the Dodd-Frank reporting and disclosure requirements and adapted well to
the then new regulatory environment.75 The results demonstrated that
82.02% of respondents at the time did not take the current regulatory regime
into account in determining the AUM size of their funds, and 72.09% of
survey respondents did not plan a strategic response to the Dodd-Frank Act
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 275.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 315-16.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 315–16.
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registration and reporting requirements.76 Firms that planned a strategic
response were smaller than those firms that did not plan a strategic response.
Of those who responded, 76.09% stated that their investors’ rate of return
was not affected by the registration and disclosure requirements.77
A majority of advisers in the first survey study quantified the cost of
compliance in a range from $50,000 to $200,000.78 However, a significant
minority estimated that the total compliance cost would range between
$200,000 to over $400,000.79 Although a majority of advisers spent fewer
than 500 hours to comply with the new registration and reporting
requirements, many fund advisers estimated it will take them between 500
and 1000 hours to comply with the requirements. The hours needed to
comply with all federal rules and regulations pertaining to hedge fund
advisers range from under 100 up to 4000 hours, with a majority of responses
ranging from over 300 hours to 800 hours.80
A majority of respondents did not feel the need to change the size of
their AUM, and Dodd-Frank Act regulations were not factors a majority of
respondents considered if they did change the AUM size of their funds. For
80.46% of respondents, the Form PF threshold for quarterly reporting of $1.5
billion AUM was not taken into account in determining the appropriate size
of AUM for the funds they manage.81 A majority of the 19.54% of
respondents who would take the Form PF threshold into account plan to stay
under the Form PF threshold for quarterly reporting of $1.5 billion AUM.82
Anecdotal evidence collected during the course of the survey study
suggested that the information disclosed by hedge fund advisers in required
Forms ADV and PF could then be presented by advisers and third party
service providers in ways that in effect “flatten out” and “sanitize” the
disclosures.83 Although the level of sanitizing of disclosures could not be
verified, sanitized disclosures could be less useful for Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC) and SEC evaluation and their determination of
the systemic risk posed by private funds.84
To summarize, the results of the first survey study in 2013 suggested
that the private fund industry had been adjusting well to the registration and
disclosure requirements for private fund advisers introduced in Title IV in

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 315–16.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2012.85 The impact of the registration and disclosure rules appeared to be
much less intense than the industry initially anticipated. Although hedge
fund advisers seemed to absorb the reported cost implications of registration
and disclosure rules relatively quickly after registration, the long-term cost
implications of registration and reporting obligations still had the potential
to affect the private fund industry in the long run.
Because the data for the first study had been collected within three
months after the registration requirements in Title IV took effect, the author
knew that future survey studies would be needed to determine the long-term
impact of the Dodd-Frank Act.86
2. Private Fund Industry Five Years After the Dodd-Frank Act
In a second study, this author evaluated the long-term implications of
the unprecedented yet evolving post Dodd-Frank Act regulatory framework
pertaining to the private fund industry.87 The study helps clarify the relevant
long-term implications of the fundamental reshaping of the regulatory
landscape for the private fund industry through both the Dodd-Frank Act and
the JOBS Act. For the second study, this author and a team of research
assistants collected and coded data for a population of 1,267 registered
investment advisers. Respondents (N=69) answered questions in several
categories designed to identify cost, compliance, and management issues
associated with the post Dodd-Frank Act regulatory framework.88
The evidence provided in this study supports findings from the author’s
earlier study suggesting that the industry adapted well to the new regulatory
environment in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act. The findings in this
study suggested that the industry is mostly affected by the uncertainty and
higher costs associated with the Act, but under multiple metrics the industry
appeared to be coping well overall with the evolving post Dodd-Frank Act
regulatory landscape.89
Nevertheless, the findings of this study also show that the Dodd-Frank
Act had negative long-term effects on the private fund industry. More than
a third of respondents (34.9%) opined that Title IV will affect the private
fund industry in the next five years because of additional expenses, and
nearly a third (32.6%) opined that it will create barriers to entry to private
fund market entrants. Fifty percent of respondents indicated that the DoddFrank registration and disclosure rules have created higher costs that will
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 316-17.
Kaal, Private Fund Industry, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 624.
Id.
Id. at 624, 626-27, 631.
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affect their funds in the next five years. The majority of those respondents
who believed that Dodd-Frank has affected their fund(s) earnings blamed
additional compliance costs associated with Dodd-Frank. A majority of
respondents have instituted measures in response to the requirements
imposed by Title IV. The most common actions taken included: (1)
outsourcing compliance work, (2) hiring additional counsel, (3) instituting
new record-keeping policies, (4) hiring additional staff, (5) changing
marketing materials, and (6) changing communications with investors.
Moreover, a majority of respondents stated that as a result of the post DoddFrank Act regulatory regime, their AUM would need to change. While
18.2% of respondents would lower their AUM to avoid the regulatory hassle,
27.3% actually still want to increase their AUM.90 Another 27.3% desire to
attain the right size to cover expenses.
Compliance costs were a significant issue for the private fund industry,
and the survey helps clarify compliance cost issues associated with Title IV.
A majority of respondents found Dodd-Frank compliance costs to range from
$50,000 to $200,000. However, a significant minority estimated that the
total compliance costs will range from $200,000 to over $400,000.91 A
considerable number of respondents estimated the total annual cost to
comply with all federal regulations pertaining to the private fund industry at
up to $100,000. The largest number of respondents (26.5%), however,
estimated the annual compliance cost for all federal regulations at between
$100,000 and $200,000.92 A smaller group (14.3%) estimated the cost of
compliance as more than $400,000 a year.
Respondents’ estimates pertaining to compliance time are consistent
with their estimates pertaining to compliance cost. Although a clear majority
of adviser respondents spent fewer than 500 hours to comply with Title IV,
a noticeable minority (11.5%) estimated compliance time at more than 1000
hours. Sixty-five and one-tenth percent of respondents estimated the total
time required to comply with all federal regulations at between 100 and 500
hours. However, a significant minority (20.9%) estimated it above 1000
hours.
The results in several survey question categories suggest that Title IV
of the Dodd-Frank Act had a negligible effect on the private fund industry.
Most importantly, 65% of private fund adviser respondents believed that
their fund earnings were not affected by Title IV, and 75.4% opined that
profits were not affected by the increased compliance requirements in Title
IV. A majority (74.5%) of private fund adviser respondents do not plan a
strategic response to Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. A majority of
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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respondents did take the regulatory regime into account before Dodd-Frank,
implying that Dodd-Frank did not make much difference in the way
respondents run their business. However, of those who responded, 70.6%
would not take the current regulatory regime into account in determining the
AUM size of their funds. While a majority of respondents (33.3%) prefer an
AUM size of between $500 million and $1 billion, no clear majority emerges
as to the preference pertaining to the $1.5 billion Form PF quarterly reporting
threshold for larger funds. And, a majority of adviser respondents (66.7%)
did not take the $1.5 billion AUM threshold under Form PF for quarterly
reporting into account in determining the appropriate size of AUM for the
fund(s) they manage. While 26.5% of respondents opined that there was no
impact on their AUM preference, target investment opportunities and
additional expenses did influence respondents’ AUM preferences.
Moreover, private fund advisers in the sample did not terminate existing
employment relationships.
Few respondents severed an advising
relationship, changed funds’ (legal) structure, liquidated positions, changed
investment styles, changed portfolio structure, or closed funds to new
investors.
Based on the findings in this study, the SEC’s attempts at clarifying and
optimizing the legal framework post Dodd-Frank Act effectively supported
the industry in its efforts to comply with the revised standards. At the same
time, there is sufficient evidence in the findings of this study suggesting that
the SEC’s implementation and clarification of Dodd-Frank Act registration
and reporting requirements for private funds also created uncertainty and
higher costs for the industry.
In summary, the second survey study shows that the private investment
fund industry had adjusted well to the Title IV requirements. The long-term
impact of the evolving post Dodd-Frank Act regulatory landscape appeared
to be much less intense than the industry initially anticipated.93 The longterm cost implications of registration and reporting obligations as reported
in this study appear to be absorbed relatively quickly after registration.94
3. Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act
Because the first survey study in the private investment fund manager
registration context left many issues pertaining to private investment fund
disclosures open, the author conducted a follow-on study in 2015.95 More
specifically, because this author’s prior studies suggested that the SEC’s
93. Id.
94. Id. at 666-67.
95. See generally Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures, supra note 9 (examining the
consequences of the disclosure requirements on the private fund industry).
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mandated collection of private fund data in Form PF created several core
challenges for the private fund industry and for the SEC, the follow-on
survey focused on the Dodd-Frank-mandated SEC collection of sensitive
proprietary information from private fund advisers. The key findings of the
follow-on study quantified, evaluated, and clarified many core open issues
with respect to the SEC’s efforts to collect private fund data through Form
PF, including data in relation to: (1) the required resources for completing
Form PF, (2) shortcomings of and SEC guidance on Form PF (3) adequacy
of filers’ reporting systems and service providers, and (4) issues associated
with investor relations. The author worked with the SEC in the context of
the follow-on study to ensure that the SEC’s most pressing concerns
pertaining to then new Form PF were included in the survey instrument.
The key findings of the follow-on study indicated that the majority of
private fund advisers responding to the survey incurred less than $10,000 to
prepare their initial data reporting to the SEC, with the cost of subsequent
annual Form PF filings at about half the initial cost.96 Larger private fund
advisers, required to file quarterly, were faced with substantially higher
compliance costs, both for their initial data reporting and for subsequent
quarterly filings.97 While the SEC appeared to have overestimated the costs
of Form PF compliance for larger private fund advisers, the data analysis in
the follow-on study affirmed SEC cost estimates for smaller private fund
advisers’ Form PF compliance costs.98
The data analysis in the follow-on study suggested that the overall effect
of private fund disclosure requirements on the private fund industry was
moderate but could be further improved. The majority of SEC-registered
private fund advisers identified the ambiguity of Form PF data reporting
requirements as the most pressing issue.99 However, the majority of
respondents also considered their existing reporting systems adequate for
capturing the information required by the SEC and agreed with the SEC’s
definitions and instructions for Form PF.
Several survey questions pertained to the purpose of Form PF and
required filing resources. Respondents identified the SEC’s objective of
assessing systemic risk and the historical lack of private fund information
provided by the industry to the SEC as the primary purposes of Form PF
disclosure requirements.100 Commenters also argued that FSOC and Office
of Financial Research (OFR) monitoring of risk, investment adviser
examinations, and the collection of risk exposure information were
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 431, 469, 471.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 447–48.
Id. at 431, 454, 470.
Id. at 445, 464.
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important purposes in the enactment of Form PF.101
The completion and filing of Form PF required the commitment of
resources from and expenditures by the private fund industry. A majority of
respondents (59.18%) stated that the additional expenditures required to
complete and file Form PF for the first time were under $10,000.102 A
majority of commenters (57.14%) identified the cost of subsequent annual
Form PF filings at about half of the first-time filing cost, i.e., around $5,000.
A breakdown of respondents by AUM suggested that larger private fund
advisers, required to file quarterly, were faced with substantially higher
compliance costs, both for their initial data reporting and for subsequent
quarterly filings.103 The data does not identify the long-term costs for the
private fund industry of having to complete and file Form PF on an annual
or quarterly basis.
The overall expenses necessary to complete and file Form PF
correspond with resource requirements, such as the staff required to file
Form PF and the total number of hours it took to complete Form PF. A
majority of respondents (67.35%) used only one to three individuals to
complete Form PF. Similarly, a majority of respondents (69.39%) indicated
that it took staff less than 50 hours to complete Form PF.104
The survey identified shortcomings in the design, definitions, and
guidance of Form PF. Respondents identified the burdensome nature and
the ambiguity of Form PF as the most pressing issues with Form PF.105 While
a majority of respondents (59.18%) agreed with the definitions or
instructions in Form PF, respondents nevertheless argued that performance
measures in Question 17, and counterparties and definitions of
counterparties in Questions 22 and 23, required a level of interpretation.106
The minority of respondents (40.82%) who disagreed with the definitions or
instructions in Form PF generally disagreed with the definition of the term
“funds.” Commenters were equally split on whether Form PF questions
pertaining to calculating regulatory assets under management (RAUM)
required filers to interpret RAUM for purposes of completing Form PF.
Most respondents appreciated both SEC guidance and SEC flexibility
in responding to questions regarding Form PF. A majority of respondents
assessed the best level of SEC guidance in the context of their Form PF
completion as sufficient or good.107 The majority of the commenters who

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 447, 465.
Id. at 447–48, 465.
Id. at 449-50, 465.
Id. at 433, 452, 465.
Id. at 453, 465.
Id. at 429, 465.
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believed that SEC guidance was inadequate indicated that SEC guidance was
particularly unclear with respect to Section 1c, Item B (regarding Reporting
Funds). This was consistent with the responses that disagreed with the
definition of funds in Form PF. Most respondents (72.92%) agreed that the
SEC’s flexibility in answering questions with respect to Form PF was
helpful. Commenters stated that SEC flexibility was valuable because it
enabled respondents to interpret Form PF, it increased respondents’ ability
to use their own internal methodologies, it helped them articulate their own
assumptions, it clarified a lot of questions, and it simplified the completion
of the form.108
The survey identified the adequacy of private funds’ existing reporting
systems utilized to capture the information required in Form PF. A majority
of respondents (65.22%) stated that their existing internal reporting systems
adequately capture the information required by Form PF.109 More
specifically, the majority of respondents did not encounter difficulties in
identifying data responsive to questions about counterparty credit exposure,
by using counterparties’ names on trading and/or legal records. Several
respondents (34.78%) opined that their existing internal reporting systems
were insufficient to respond to questions on Form PF because they require
further analysis and calculations.
Survey respondents also largely (72.29%) abstained from employing a
service-provider to complete Form PF.110 Firms’ ability to use existing
internal reporting systems to complete Form PF is consistent with firms’
preference for completing Form PF in-house. A majority of respondents
actually suggested that Form PF can be completed in-house. Others opined
that completing Form PF would not justify the expense of hiring a serviceprovider. Commenters identified several challenges in working with a
service-provider, including the investment of time and expenses to develop
processes, and the burden of providing service-providers with the required
information. The minority of respondents who hired a service-provider
stated they did so because of difficulties in aggregating the data and entering
it directly without having an internal system to assist in the process; the
service providers’ knowledge and their industry insight into answer
methodology; a desire to ensure consistency in preparation; and the burden
of how long it would take to complete Form PF in-house.111
In summary, the findings of the follow-on survey study suggested that
the overall effect of Form PF data reporting requirements on the private fund
industry was less severe than widely expected by the industry. In light of the
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 457, 465.
Id. at 459, 466.
Id. at 461, 466.
Id. at 462, 466.
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cost data provided by the study (for both smaller and larger private fund
advisers), industry concerns that mandatory private fund adviser registration
and disclosure requirements could inappropriately burden investment
advisers seemed to be mostly unfounded. The results of the follow-on study
complemented earlier findings suggesting that the private fund industry
adjusted well to the reporting obligations mandated by Title IV.
Nevertheless, the data analysis and the findings of the study indicated
several areas of concern with existing Form PF questions and requirements.
Important issues include the ambiguity of several key questions in Form PF;
the time constraints required to answer certain questions, such as Question
16 (types of investors), Question 17 (performance), and Question 7 (related
persons); respondents’ disagreement with the definition of funds; and the
lack of adequate SEC guidance for Section 1c, Item B (information regarding
reporting fund).112 Other issues identified in the study pertain to the
insufficiency of existing reporting systems for some firms; difficulties in
aggregating the required Form PF data and entering it directly without the
availability of a system to assist in the process; and challenges in working
with a service-provider, including process development and the burden of
providing service-providers with the required information.113
4. Dodd-Frank Act—Comparative Evidence 2012 and 2015
In an effort to understand the consistency of short-term and long-term
surveys on the impact of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, the author’s
comparative survey study examined the private fund industry’s reactions and
adjustments to a rapidly evolving regulatory framework three years after the
first application of mandatory registration and disclosure rules for private
fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act.114 To add a historical time series
perspective via this comparative survey study, the author used two datasets
(2012: N = 94; 2015: N = 69) for a population of 1,267 registered investment
advisers. The author analyzed and compared survey respondents’ short- and
long-term estimations of industry effects.115 The data suggested that
immediate and short-term concerns had given way to adaptation to the
changes.
The comparative survey study indicated that compliance costs
associated with the evolving regulatory environment for private fund
advisers had many unexpected consequences that had the potential to further

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 451, 453-56, 467.
Id. at 467.
Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 1151.
Id. at 1151, 1154.
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Several developments are particularly
shape industry practices.116
noteworthy. While in both the 2012 and 2015 surveys a majority (72% and
75%, respectively) of respondents did not plan a strategic response to Title
IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, in 2015 a substantially higher rate of respondents
(47% in 2015 versus 25% in 2012) suggested that they changed their
communications with investors.117 This was consistent with anecdotal
evidence suggesting that since the 2012 survey, private fund advisers had
changed and increased their communications with investors, often based on
advice from counsel. In a legal environment where SEC examinations,
enforcement actions, and major settlements define the rules promulgated
following the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, it had become increasingly
important for private fund advisers to communicate with investors,
emphasizing the effect of these new conditions on fund operations.118 The
comparative data also suggested that the industry is increasingly doing such
work in-house. This is consistent with the SEC’s emphasis on COO liability
and subsequent enforcement actions since 2012 that have focused on
compliance departments. Moreover, the comparative data suggest that since
2012 at least a part of the industry was closing funds to new investors and
even changing funds’ legal structures in response to the evolving regulatory
landscape.119
Perhaps the most important findings of the comparative survey study
pertained to the comparative and long-term implications of the compliance
costs associated with the evolving post-Dodd-Frank-Act regulatory
environment and its effect on private fund advisers.120 The comparative data
suggested that between 2012 and 2015 the industry was subject to an overall
higher cost structure.121 The annual cost of compliance doubled for many
survey respondents, moving from the $50,000 to $100,000 range to the
$100,000 to $200,000 range. The survey provided evidence that the industry
became more effective from 2012 to 2015 in its compliance with obligations
related to the Dodd-Frank Act.122 However, assuming that compliance hour
requirements were a proxy for compliance cost, the comparative data
suggested that the cost structure for all federal regulation increased between
2012 and 2015.123
Comparative data on the possible impact of the evolving regulatory
environment on the AUM of private investment fund advisers facilitated an
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 1198.
Id. at 1185, 1198-1201.
Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1201.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1201.
Id.
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analysis of the implications of rulemaking on the industry’s evolution. That
data suggested that investment advisers of private funds were increasingly
taking the regulatory structure into account when determining their AUM.124
It showed that the 2015 survey respondents preferred a higher AUM than the
2012 survey respondents. Whereas, in 2012, 29% of survey respondents had
an AUM preference in the range from $150 million to $500 million, and only
16% preferred a $500 million to $1 billion AUM, in 2015 these figures had
reversed; only 15% of respondents had an AUM preference in the range from
$150 million to $500 million, and 33% of respondents preferred a $500
million to $1 billion AUM.125 While this finding could be partially explained
with the higher overall post-Dodd-Frank-Act cost structure for the industry,
it was inconsistent with private fund advisers’ general tendency to grow
AUM to increase profitability.
To ensure that as much as possible of the net management fee becomes
compensation for the managers, investment advisers typically try to allocate
as many operating expenses to the fund as possible. Nevertheless, the
comparative data provided in the survey study suggested that the additional
regulatory obligations imposed on the private investment fund industry in
the aftermath of the tectonic regulatory shift stemming from the Dodd-Frank
Act influenced AUM preferences. From a policy perspective, changing
AUM preferences associated with compliance costs could eventually result
in consolidations that facilitate cost savings or precipitate a trend towards
family offices that do not manage third-party assets.
The impact of the evolving post-Dodd-Frank Act regulatory
environment on investment advisers’ profitability had raised industry-wide
concerns. Nevertheless, the majority of survey respondents in both the 2012
survey (76.1%) and the 2015 survey (65%) believed that the Dodd-Frank Act
did not affect reporting funds’ earnings.126 Of those respondents who did
believe that the Act affected their reporting funds’ earnings, the comparative
data suggested that between 2012 and 2015 investment advisers saw the
costs on fund earnings increasingly associated with opportunity costs (2012:
9%; 2015: 32%) rather than with increased expenses (2012: 53%; 2015:
36%).127 This was consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that the
industry largely absorbed the increased expenses associated with the DoddFrank Act through the increasing use of pass-through expense terms when

124. Id. at 1190-92, 1201.
125. Id. at 1193, 1202.
126. See id. at 1195, 1202 (reviewing the results of a survey looking at how Dodd-Frank
influenced AUM preferences, amidst a discussion that investment advisers try to increase the
amount of operating expenses allocated to funds).
127. See id. at 1202 (continuing to share the results of a survey used to determine how
Dodd-Frank influenced AUM preferences).
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structuring investment adviser and private fund relationships between 2012
and 2015.128
The private fund industry had long voiced concerns about the long-term
implications of the evolving regulatory environment on investment advisers’
reporting funds. The comparative survey study suggested that the long-term
effects of that environment were more substantial than the industry and
regulators initially anticipated.129 A greater percentage of 2015 responses,
compared to 2012 responses, made references to “lower returns” and plans
to “consolidate or close funds,” which seemed to suggest a more substantial
effect on reporting funds.130 Confirming these trends, 2012 and 2015
estimates predicted the state of the private fund industry over the next five
years and also made references to additional expenses and barriers to entry
to the private fund market. Whereas in the 2012 survey only 24% of
respondents referenced barriers to entry for small firms, in 2015, 33% made
such references.
5. What Drives Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Costs for Private
Funds?
Using the unprecedented compliance cost estimates from the earlier
survey studies,131 this author applied multiple regression analyses to evaluate
the possible drivers and effects of Title IV Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs
on the private fund industry.132 Using hand-selected compliance cost
estimates from private fund advisers (N=94), the study showed with two
independent datasets that the number of funds managed by private fund
advisers was associated with Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs.
The study demonstrated that the size of registered private fund advisers
as measured by AUM was not associated with the per-unit cost of Title IV
compliance and other independent variables as proxies for cost. These
findings were consistent with the hypothesis that the cost of financial
128. See id. (discussing how the survey looking at how Dodd-Frank influenced AUM
preferences is consistent with anecdotal evidence).
129. See id. at 1202 (arguing that the survey examining how Dodd-Frank influenced
AUM preferences indicates that Dodd-Frank had a more extreme impact than regulators
expected).
130. Id. at 1197, 1199, 1202-03.
131. Survey results indicate that the majority of hedge fund advisers and private fund
advisers expect Dodd-Frank related compliance costs to range from $50,000 to $200,000. See
Kaal, Registration, supra note 9, at 298; Kaal, Private Fund Industry, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 650; Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4 at 1186.
132. See Kaal, Compliance Costs, supra note 9, at 8 (describing the study design, which
included four dependent variables with data obtained from prior surveys: cost of compliance,
median cost measures, annual time required for compliance, and median annual time
measures for compliance).
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regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act brought increasing returns to scale.133
These results of the study confirmed the findings in other studies suggesting
that regulatory compliance costs can bring increasing returns to scale.134
A significant long-term implication of the results included the creation
of barriers to entry for smaller private fund advisers. In other words, if Title
IV compliance costs bring increasing returns to scale because the costs of
Title IV compliance favor larger firms, Title IV requirements may contribute
to the creation of barriers to entry for smaller private fund advisers.135 This
author demonstrated in this study that barriers to entry also mean that smaller
private fund advisers could get forced out of the market or consolidate with
other private fund advisers. Consolidation of smaller private fund advisers,
in turn, can contribute further to an already existing trend towards private
fund adviser consolidation.
The study introduces for the first time possible dynamic elements in the
regulation of the private investment fund industry. The literature on dynamic
regulation emphasizes adaptable institutions and rulemaking processes to
overcome suboptimal governance outcomes.136 Rules can become adaptable
if institutions and rulemaking processes integrate feedback effects, including
feedback effects between the industry and regulators, that produce timely,
relevant, and decentralized information for rulemaking ex-ante before rulemakers finalize rules.137 By increasing the availability of relevant
133. See id. at 22-23 (discussing the results of the multiple regression, including how the
increasing returns to scale result from a high up-front regulatory cost with significantly less
costly subsequent reporting obligations).
134. See id. at 23 (synthesizing the results of the multiple regression with prior research).
135. See id. at 23 (explaining why compliance costs impose a barrier-on-entry to smaller
firms).
136. See e.g., Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law: Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional
Economics Framework, in FESTSCHRIFT ZU EHREN VON CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER 1211 (Wulf A.
Kaal, Matthias Schmidt & Andreas Schwartze eds., 2014); Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation
via Governmental Contracts, in ROBERT WALDBURGER ET AL., LAW & ECONOMICS:
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR PETER NOBEL ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG 65, 66 (2015) (advocating for the use
of governmental contracts to enable feedback processes, which in turn facilitate institutionspecific ex-ante experimentation that allow for rulemaking to adapt to future contingencies);
Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts
to Data 57 JURIMETRICS 169, 171-72, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808044 [https://perma.cc/3
4Q4-46QT] [hereinafter Kaal, Disruptive Innovation] (explaining how the current regulatory
rulemaking process, which emphasizes ex-post facts-based trial-and-error rulemaking, leads
to suboptimal outcomes because the pattern of disruptive innovation doesn’t provide the time
needed for fact gathering); Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation, in PERSPECTIV
ES IN LAW, BUSINESS AND INNOVATION (Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Toshiyuki Kono & Erik
P.M. Vermeulen eds., https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040) [https://perma.cc/K7JQ-855F]
[hereinafter Kaal, Dynamic Regulation] (arguing that dynamic regulatory processes can solve
the problem of innovation developing faster applicable regulations, or the so-called “pacing
problem”).
137. See Kaal, Dynamic Regulation, supra note 136 at 17-20 (describing the use of
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information for ex-ante rulemaking, dynamic regulation lowers unforeseen
contingencies in the rulemaking process while increasing regulatory
certainty. Identifying forms of dynamic regulation for the private investment
fund industry has the potential to overcome many of the identified policy
challenges associated with Title IV.138
6. Dodd-Frank Impact on Private Fund Performance
As previously noted, an important question repeatedly raised by the
private investment fund industry lobby pertains to the impact of Title IV on
private investment fund performance and profitability. Attempts to rescind
Title IV via the Investment Advisers Modernization Act of 2016 and
announcements of the Trump Administration pertaining to a reduction of the
regulatory burden in the Dodd-Frank Act illustrate the highly politically
sensitive nature of Dodd-Frank Act registration and disclosure obligations
for the private fund industry.
The author’s 2015 paper exploits a natural quasi-experiment to isolate
the effects that were uniquely due to Title IV: private fund investment
advisers with AUM of more than $150 million are required to register with
the SEC and are subject to substantially increased public disclosure
obligations.139 To analyze the effect of Title IV on the private fund industry,
this author and two co-authors used five years of private fund advisers’
performance data with over 7,000 reporting private funds in a regression
discontinuity (RD) design, using multiple hand-selected control groups and
several iterations of broad and narrow RD designs and robustness checks.
The findings in this paper are consistent and do not support the private
fund industry’s claims that the increased supervision and disclosure
mandated in the Dodd-Frank Act have a negative effect on private fund
earnings. Using an array of robustness tests validating the RD results, the
paper shows that the requirements introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act create
no significant effect on private fund performance. The P-values for all RD
results are above the 5% level and confirm the finding of no affect. By
contrast, the private fund industry expected the introduction of the DoddFrank Act to result in negative effects on private investment fund returns.
The absence of any statistically significant effect of mandatory disclosure on

various types of feedback effects in dynamic regulation).
138. Cf. id. at 20-21 (positing that deferred-prosecution-agreements and venture capital
investments demonstrate where innovation is trending such that they can be used as feedback
processes within dynamic regulation).
139. See Kaal, Luppi, & Paterlini, supra note 9 (describing a study that is attempting to
quantify the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act disclosure requirements on private fund
performance).
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hedge fund returns may suggest that the transparency costs associated with
disclosure do not significantly affect the profitability of hedge fund advisers.
B. Systemic Risk
The public media, politicians, and regulators regularly debate the
potential for private investment funds to contribute to systemic risk in
financial markets. Because the private investment fund industry experienced
substantial growth over the past two decades, concerns about hedge funds’
systemic risk have increased, and regulators have taken measures to mitigate
the possible risks associated with these funds. The Dodd-Frank Act created
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) with the primary
mandate of guarding against systemic risk and correcting perceived
regulatory weaknesses that may have contributed to the financial crisis of
2008-09. The SEC collects data pertaining to private fund advisers in order
to facilitate the FSOC’s assessment of non-bank financial institutions’
potential systemic risks.
In a first paper on private investment funds’ systemic risk implications,
this author evaluated the Dodd-Frank Act’s potential to address the systemic
risk implications of private investment funds.140 The paper created and
evaluated data evidence that demonstrated that the SEC’s data collection
encountered accuracy and consistency problems that hampered the FSOC’s
ability to evaluate the systemic risk of private funds.141 The author showed
that while the SEC’s data played a crucial role in all stages of FSOC’s
systemic risk assessment of private funds, the FSOC relied most heavily on
some of the most problematic disclosure items collected by the SEC.
The paper demonstrated that the data collected via Form PF had several
core shortcomings. These included: the ambiguity of several key questions
on Form PF, the inaccuracy of Form PF definitions and the corresponding
insufficiency of SEC guidance for Form PF, and difficulties in aggregating
the required Form PF information.142
By referencing the author’s prior work and using the data collected in
surveys to analyze the systemic risk of private investment funds,143 the paper
140. See Kaal, Systemic Risk, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 167-69
(detailing how the Dodd-Frank Act empowered the SEC to promulgate rules intended to
mitigate the private fund industry’s potential systemic risk, and how, despite challenges, the
SEC’s chosen method, collection of data through Form PF, has been accepted by the industry).
141. See id. at 190–93 (sharing the results of the analysis, demonstrating Form PF data
insufficiency and possible inaccuracy).
142. See id. at 191 (citing his own prior work to demonstrate shortcomings of Form PF).
143. See Kaal, Systemic Risk, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 168 (citing
two essays as indicating that the mandated data collection in Form PF could cause difficulties
for FSOC in evaluating the systemic risk of hedge funds); Registration, supra note 9; Kaal,
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demonstrated that the systemic risk assessment process employed by the
FSOC was suboptimal.144 Several core Form PF questions that provide
specific information for FSOC’s stage one threshold assessment encounter
problems. More specifically, the definition of RAUM required substantive
interpretation by filers. FSOC used valuations in Form PF that are associated
with RAUM, such as gross asset value of reporting fund (Question 8), the
value of derivative positions (Questions 13 and 44), financing information
and financing liquidity (Questions 46 and 58), as well as gross and net assets
value of reporting fund (Questions 8 and 9) to determine various stage one
thresholds. Given FSOC’s direct or indirect use of RAUM-related data (and
FSOC’s emphasis on such data), in combination with the author’s prior study
suggesting that RAUM requires substantial interpretation, the paper showed
that it was at least questionable if FSOC would be able to use the related
Form PF data effectively and sustainably for its systemic risk evaluations
and the designation of non-bank financial companies as systemically risky.145
The paper further showed that in addition to the specific matching of
Form PF data issues with FSOC’s uses of Form PF data, Form PF data may
also have presented several more generic areas of concern for FSOC’s
systemic risk evaluation.146 Over 40% of respondents in the author’s prior
study suggested that they disagreed with definitions or instructions in Form
PF.147 This suggested that a large proportion of filers are uncertain as to how
Form PF questions are to be answered. This uncertainty raised the possibility
that the filers were using estimates and a variety of assumptions to complete
Form PF.148 If FSOC relied on Form PF data in its systemic risk assessment
that is subject to inaccuracies, the paper suggested that that FSOC’s work
pertaining to private funds could in turn be subject to errors.149
In a second paper on private investment funds’ possible systemic risk,
the author showed that private investment fund advisers’ systemic risk
disclosure obligations under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and SEC
implementation rules had unanticipated knock-on effects on other areas of
the law and hedge fund practices. More specifically, Federal Bankruptcy
Rule 2019 (Rule 2019) had been the subject of intense professional and
scholarly debate before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.150 The federal
Private Fund Disclosures, supra note 9.
144. See Kaal, Systemic Risk, supra note 10, at 190-193 (discussing the sub-optimality of
systemic risk data).
145. See id. at 192-93.
146. See id. at 193.
147. See Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures, supra note 9, at 26 (indicating that 40.82% of
respondents disagreed with definitions or instructions in Form PF).
148. See Kaal, Systemic Risk, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 193.
149. See id. at 193.
150. See Kaal, Bankruptcy, supra note 9, at 195.
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bankruptcy bench, practitioners, and academics debated the importance of
the purported purpose of Rule 2019, the necessity for hedge funds to protect
trading strategies and proprietary information, and the role of creditors and
groups of creditors in the bankruptcy process. This paper added another
element to the debate by evaluating possible implications of systemic risk
disclosures by hedge fund managers under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act
and SEC implementation rules in the bankruptcy context. In the paper, the
author provided evidence of a substantial overlap between systemic risk
disclosure requirements under Title IV and the disclosure requirements
under the fully-revised version of Bankruptcy Rule 2019 (Revised Rule
2019).151
The paper demonstrated that public access to systemic risk disclosures
by hedge fund managers under the Dodd-Frank Act and SEC implementation
rules could improve hedge funds’ distressed investments and their
bankruptcy practices.152 Systemic risk disclosures could play a possible role
in bankruptcy especially if more evidence emerges suggesting that Revised
Rule 2019 could result in less overall disclosure by distressed debt investors.
The mere threat of public access or sharing of hedge funds’ systemic risk
data filings in Form PF filings between the SEC and the federal bankruptcy
bench could help facilitate some level of discipline for distressed debt
investors’ engagements in the bankruptcy process.153 The commonalities
between disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act and Revised
Rule 2019 suggested a possible role for systemic risk disclosures in the
bankruptcy process.
The paper highlighted that the threat of public disclosure of systemic
risk filings by hedge funds via the bankruptcy process only marginally
affected hedge funds’ tactics and their role in distressed investing.154 Hedge
funds’ disclosure obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act were then still rather
generic. The SEC had not yet standardized the requirements, and it was
unclear if the SEC would expand the systemic risk disclosure obligations for
hedge funds investing in distressed securities. The paper asserted that the
hedge fund industry’s continuous, expanding, and increasingly assertive
presence in distressed securities investments could change this evaluation in
the future.155
In a third paper, published five years after the enactment of the DoddFrank Act, this author summarized the pre- and post-crisis debate and
151. See id. at 195.
152. See id. at 232.
153. See id. at 200–01, 226, 232–33.
154. See id. at 201, 232.
155. See id. at 225 (predicting that some of the discussed risk disclosures may become
more relevant for the bankruptcy process going forward).
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highlighted and contrasted the post-crisis evidence regarding hedge funds’
alleged systemic risk.156 In particular, the author examined evidence
regarding specific factors surrounding hedge funds’ possible contributions
to systemic risk, including risk management incentives, leverage, liquidity
characteristics, regulation, financial stability, transparency, and their
potential to induce and perpetuate market contagion.157
The paper outlined the empirical evidence on hedge funds’ possible
systemic risk in the aftermath of the 2007–08 financial crisis.158 Several
theoretical academic studies pointed to the potential for a possible link
between hedge funds and systemic risk, especially as it relates to liquidity.
Another strand of literature examined in the paper evaluated the potential for
“tail risk” induced by hedge funds’ risk management incentives that may
increase risk-taking and leverage while shrinking hedge fund liquidity.159
The paper evaluated academic studies examining several additional factors
in this process, including hedge funds’ exposures to macroeconomic risks,
their contribution to a “shadow banking” system, and the potential for hedge
funds to induce and perpetuate market contagion.
C. Private Fund Investor Due Diligence
Since 2010, investment due diligence has become an increasingly
litigated issue in the capital formation and allocation process.160 Lock step
with the growth of the private investment fund industry, private fund investor
due diligence litigation has increased significantly since the financial crisis
of 2008-09. Courts in the early 2010s started to set out private fund investor
due diligence standards and provided guidance on the requirements and
limits of due diligence. The increasing due diligence litigation record
underscores the heightened importance of due diligence in the capital
formation and allocation process since the financial crisis of 2008-09.
Despite the increasing relevance of investment due diligence in the
capital formation and allocation process and despite increasing litigation in
the context of investment due diligence, the industry is mostly left to its own
devices to ensure adequate due diligence standards apply. Little to no
156. See Kaal & Krause, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 3-21 (outlining
the debate regarding the potential for hedge funds to contribute to systemic risk in financial
markets and examining evidence about specific factors surrounding hedge funds’ possible
contributions to systemic risk).
157. See id. at 1.
158. See id. at 12–19 (summarizing empirical evidence gathered by several scholars
before concluding that hedge funds may play a role in introducing at least some systemic risk
into the financial system).
159. See id. at 20.
160. See Kaal, Due Diligence, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 8.
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guidance existed prior to the author’s study on applicable standards for
private investment fund due diligence. Available resources describe best
practices but do not sufficiently outline the legal requirements pertaining to
private investment fund due diligence. The available case law only
marginally provides relevant guidance on private fund investor due
diligence.
The author’s study provided the first comprehensive evaluation of the
changing private fund investor due diligence landscape.161 To provide the
industry with data, data trend analyses, and guidance on applicable legal
private fund investor due diligence standards, the author examined two
datasets: (1) private investment fund advisers’ SEC Form ADV II filings
from 2007 to 2014 (N=100392), and (2) the publicly available litigation
record pertaining to private fund investor due diligence from 1995 to 2015
(N=572). After highlighting important changes in the quality and quantity
of private fund investor due diligence disclosures in SEC Form ADV Part II,
the author summarized and illustrated the entire litigation record on private
investment fund due diligence from 1995 to 2015, breaking down individual
expert testimony provided by due diligence experts in courts and evaluating
expert guidance on applicable investor due diligence best practices.162
To summarize the results, the data provided in the author’s study
suggested that since 2010 private fund advisers increasingly engaged in
private fund investor due diligence, partially in an effort to protect
themselves from investor criticism and lawsuits.163 Since 2010, an increasing
number of SEC Form ADV II brochure filers included investor due diligence
disclosures, and the number of filers who included those disclosures
remained relatively even between 2012 and 2014. The quantity of investor
due diligence disclosures relative to total SEC Form ADV II brochure filings
had increased substantially; the due diligence count exceeded the total ADV
II filings for the first time in 2014. Filers appeared to see a need to increase
the quantity of investor due diligence disclosures in Form ADV II between
2011 and 2014. The increasing caseload on private fund investor due
diligence since 2005 could have suggested that applicable legal standards
needed to be further clarified.164
The data used in the study demonstrated that between 1995 and 2015
private fund investor due diligence had reached new and lasting prominence
in the court system.165 Madoff-related cases in the aftermath of the discovery
of the Madoff Ponzi scheme in 2008 only partially explained the significant
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See id. at 9.
See id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10, 24, 59.
Id. at 11.
Id.
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increase in the prevalence and importance of private fund investor due
diligence after 2009. The study demonstrated that the legal standards
applicable to private fund investor due diligence were somewhat inconsistent
and suboptimal and merited clarification.
In the study, the author predicted that the heightened emphasis on
private fund investor due diligence as demonstrated in the study
foreshadowed the possibility of standardization of private fund investor due
diligence.166 Lack of standards for private fund investor due diligence could
partially be attributed to private funds’ unique position in markets — unlike
mutual funds, private funds evolved as unregistered entities, free from most
regulatory oversight. Accordingly, private fund investor due diligence
evolved without regulatory oversight. The study suggested that private
investment fund due diligence may follow the same evolution as banks’ risk
evaluation. Whereas in the early 2000s banks operated with general risk
evaluation strategies but no uniformity and no applicable standards, today
banks’ risk evaluation is heavily regulated and turned into a science.
IV.

CONFLUENCE OF PRIVATE AND MUTUAL FUNDS

Increasing evidence suggests that the traditional distinction between
mutual and private funds is dissipating. Prior to the 2008-09 credit crisis,
the asset management industry was bifurcated into two distinct product
segments, regulated (mutual) funds and private funds. That traditional
distinction between mutual and private funds is dissipating. The author’s
contributions in this context167 conceptualized the confluence between
mutual funds and private investment funds as a process and identified a trend
that alternative mutual funds and other products that are fundamentally
mutual funds are increasingly becoming more like hedge funds.168 The
articles show that changes pertaining to hedge funds in the regulatory
framework post Dodd-Frank Act tend to render hedge funds and hedge-fundlike vehicles more mutual-fund-like. This is not just a result of more
stringent regulations enacted via the Dodd-Frank Act in the aftermath of the
financial crisis; the liberalization of the advertising restrictions post DoddFrank Act also makes hedge funds more like mutual funds.
Several factors suggest that mutual funds are becoming more like hedge

166. Id. at 60.
167. Kaal, Confluence, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Kaal & Anderson,
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
168. See generally Kaal, Confluence, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.
(examining factors affecting the confluence of mutual funds and hedge funds and its
consequences); Kaal & Anderson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (examining the
investment strategies and risk attributes that mutual funds and hedge funds share).
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funds as a matter of investment strategy, while hedge funds are becoming
more like mutual funds as a matter of the regulatory framework.169 The
factors that perhaps best illustrate the confluence of private and mutual funds
include the growth of the private fund industry and the proliferation of retail
alternative funds in combination with the fundamental reshaping of the
regulatory landscape for the private fund industry.170 Market-driven factors
contributing to this confluence include the emergence and proliferation of
so-called retail alternative or hybrid funds, such as synthetic hedge funds and
unconstrained mutual funds. Other important confluence factors include the
increasing side-by-side management of mutual funds and hedge funds, and
public offerings of alternative asset managers, among others, in combination
with the fundamental reshaping of the regulatory landscape for the hedge
fund industry through the Dodd-Frank Act and the JOBS Act.171
Since the early 2010’s, both private and regulated fund managers have
been offering “liquid” alternative products to the same investor segments.
Liquid alternatives offer adequate management fees and strong growth
potential for mutual fund managers. For private managers, liquid alternative
products provide access to large asset pools, including defined contribution
plans, which were otherwise unavailable to private fund advisers. Increased
offerings of liquid alternatives are managers’ response to investor demands
for a combination of risk mitigation, liquidity, the lower fees associated with
mutual funds, and the absolute returns of private funds. Investments in liquid
alternatives have more than doubled since 2008 and represent over $550
billion in assets.172
Retail investors’ preferences are a major factor in the confluence of
private and mutual funds. Retail investors gained access to private fund
strategies and higher returns through liquid alternative funds. In fact, the
overall demand in the alternative investment sector is largely driven by retail
investors who seek not only the prospect of significant performance but also
risk-adjusted and consistent returns that are not correlated to the market.173
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 3.
SEI, THE RETAIL ALTERNATIVES PHENOMENON: WHAT ENTERPRISING PRIVATE FUND
MANAGERS NEED TO KNOW 2 (2013), http://goo.gl/orKIKD [https://perma.cc/6LH8-CQNC].
173. See MCKINSEY & COMPANY, THE TRILLION-DOLLAR CONVERGENCE: CAPTURING THE
NEXT WAVE OF GROWTH IN ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, 3 (2014) (“Retail investors,
meanwhile, are moving rapidly into the market, as new product vehicles provide
unprecedented access to a broad range of alternatives managers and strategies. Structural,
rather than cyclical, forces are accelerating the adoption of alternatives, chief among them the
linking of alternatives to critical investment outcomes — a phenomenon that takes the value
of alternatives strategies ‘beyond alpha.’ Gone are the days when the sole attraction of
alternatives was the prospect of high-octane performance. The market meltdown caused by
the global financial crisis, coupled with the extended period of volatility and macroeconomic
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Through liquid alternatives retail investors were able to merely pay mutual
fund fees, which in turn increased demand by retail investors for liquid
alternatives.174
A. Evidence
The emergence and proliferation of unconstrained mutual funds
(“UMFs”) provides important evidence illustrating the phenomenon of
confluence between mutual and private funds.175
UMFs display
characteristics of both mutual funds and private funds, and they occupy a
unique market niche. More specifically, by combining the regulatory
structure of a mutual fund with the investment strategy employed by a private
fund implementing a credit strategy and principally trading fixed income
instruments, UMFs transcend several of the traditional investment and legal
distinctions which have characterized mutual funds and private funds.176
UMFs are subject to the same regulatory framework as traditional mutual
funds, and they are widely offered and available to retail investors who
would otherwise be excluded from investments in private investment funds.
The author provides evidence that UMFs share multiple investment
strategies and risk attributes with fixed income hedge funds. Analyzing
trading data and prospectuses of a hand-selected sample of all unconstrained
mutual funds launched from 2010 through 2015 (N=449), the author
provided an overview of the evolution of unconstrained mutual funds,
contrasting core characteristics with publicly available data pertaining to
benchmarked mutual fund investment indices.177
UMFs exceeded the typical mutual fund “engagements” in almost all
quantifiable categories. The data analysis in the study demonstrated that
UMF trading of the referenced security and contract types clearly exceeded
the average “engagements” for mutual funds as a group.178 For instance, in
terms of short selling, UMFs exceeded other funds by more than twenty
percent in engagements. Similarly, in currency exchange transactions,
UMFs exceeded other funds by almost 30%, in restricted securities by over
40%, and in interest rates futures by over 50%. Investment categories where
uncertainty that followed, have left their marks, and investors are now turning to alternatives
for consistent, risk-adjusted returns that are uncorrelated to the market. They are also
increasingly looking to alternatives to deliver on other crucial outcomes like inflation
protection and income generation.”); id. at 15 (“[R]etail flows are expected to be three to four
times those of institutional flows. Demand has been strongest in the U.S. market . . . .”).
174. Id.
175. Kaal & Anderson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 8.
176. Id. at 5.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 37.
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UMFs exceeded other funds by around 20% include options on futures,
options on stock indexes, options on debt securities, and options on
equities.179
Moreover, UMFs consistently exceeded mutual funds in relation to
almost all investment categories. In particular, UMFs exceeded other mutual
fund “permissions” by around 10–20% in short selling, currency exchange
transactions, securities of foreign issuers, restricted securities, commodity
futures, options on index futures, options on futures, stock index futures,
interest rate futures, options on stock indexes, options on debt securities, and
options on equities.180 UMFs also used a significantly higher proportion of
short sales (as a percentage of their respective Net Asset Value (NAVs)) than
other mutual funds. They also displayed a substantially higher turnover rate
than other mutual funds trading fixed income instruments. In particular,
UMF turnover on average exceeded the turnover for other fixed income
mutual funds by over 150%.181 Finally, UMF fees generally exceed those of
other mutual funds. While the average fee charged by a UMF (1.40%)
exceeds the average fee charged by those mutual funds in the Morningstar
“non-traditional category” (1.25%) and the average fee charged by all credit
mutual funds as a group (1.15%), the fees charged by UMFs are only
marginally higher than those charged by other mutual funds.182
B. Implications
The confluence of mutual and private funds has long-term implications
for both the private and mutual fund industries. The confluence of mutual
and hedge funds affects the evolution of the hedge fund industry, rendering
it a more widely recognized industry that is part of mainstream of finance.183
Confluence factors also make governance alternatives and possible
governance improvements available for the mutual fund industry. Other
implications include a positive effect on the growth of the retail alternative
fund market and possible support for the proposition that the public/private
distinction in federal securities regulation may be dissipating. Moreover, the
confluence of mutual and investment funds through the proliferation of
UMFs calls into question the effectiveness of retail investor protections
under the Investment Companies Act of 1940.184
179. Id.
180. Id. at 38.
181. Id. at 41.
182. Id. at 42-43.
183. Kaal, Confluence, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 4.
184. See Kaal & Anderson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 48-53
(discussing the policy implications of UMF proliferation and how it undercuts the
effectiveness of Congress’ Company Act).
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Factors associated with the confluence of mutual and hedge funds help
the private investment fund industry transition from an industry operating at
the fringes of finance to one recognized as part of mainstream finance.185
Private investment funds have been able to proliferate and increasingly
attract investors due in part to the Federal Reserve’s policies and resulting
low interest rates in the early 2010s. Unprecedented changes in the rules and
regulations pertaining to the private investment fund industry under Title IV
of the Dodd-Frank Act and the JOBS Act allow increased oversight of the
industry and contribute to the increasing recognition of the industry as a fully
regulated asset class.186
The confluence of mutual and hedge funds can also influence mutual
fund governance. Given the proliferation of that confluence, it is possible
that other governance models for mutual funds emerge over time. The
proliferation of multimanager series trusts, for example, established a
hitherto nonexistent alternative governance model for mutual funds.
Multimanager series trusts can support mutual fund governance. Unlike the
board in a traditional mutual fund governance setting, the board in a
multimanager series trust arrangement is largely independent of any advisers
within the fund group. Thus, independent directors on the board are not
subject to conflicts of interest that often exist in traditional mutual fund
governance settings if directors are affiliated with the investment adviser.
Apart from its involvement in approving each adviser in a group structure,
the board in the trust setting also typically has no involvement in selecting
the group’s investment advisers, creating fewer incentives for the board to
comport with advisers in contradiction of fiduciary obligations. Despite the
open issues and possible shortcomings of the multimanager series trust
model, the trust model governance structure for mutual funds appears to offer
lasting substantive governance improvements for mutual funds.187
Factors of mutual and hedge fund confluence increase the demand for
retail alternative funds. While the market-driven proliferation of retail
alternative funds itself drives confluence, several additional nonmarket
confluence factors support the growth of the market for alternative funds.
For instance, several provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act revised legal
requirements applicable to private investment funds that in effect assimilated
the legal requirements of mutual and hedge funds. Merging the regulatory
requirements applicable to mutual funds with the formerly more distinct
rules applicable to private investment funds creates incentives for private
investment managers to set up retail alternative funds.188 A higher supply of
185.
186.
187.
188.

Kaal, Confluence, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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retail alternative funds, in turn, is likely to further increase investor demand
for retail alternative funds. A higher demand for retail alternative funds, in
turn, precipitates more sustainable market-driven confluence of the mutual
and hedge fund industries.189
The mandatory investment adviser registration provisions under the
Dodd-Frank Act incentivize investment advisers to set up retail alternative
funds. Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the registration of a
hedge fund was a significant disincentive for investment managers to enter
into the mutual fund sector. Investment advisers to hedge funds disfavored
registration with the SEC because they considered the associated disclosures
intrusive and feared negative effects on profitability. By eliminating
previous registration exemptions and requiring investment advisers with
AUM of more than $150 million to register with the SEC, the Dodd-Frank
Act mandates SEC registration and reporting of information that was hitherto
considered proprietary and private.190 Hedge fund advisers who are required
to register with the SEC have incentives to also manage mutual funds or set
up retail alternative funds because the regulatory burden is minimally higher
in comparison with preregistration legal requirements.191 Some registered
hedge fund advisers may choose to offer hedge fund strategies in a mutual
fund setting, thus increasing the trend towards confluence.
Mutual and private investment fund confluence contributes to the
gradual erosion of the public/private distinction in federal securities
regulation. Beyond the retail investor-protection concerns associated with
UMFs, the growth in the number of UMFs calls into question the continuing
relevance of the public/private divide in federal securities regulation.192 The
academic literature on this topic has explored a number of different subjects
and suggested a continuous blurring of the traditional boundary lines
between regulated companies and activities on the one hand, and “private”
firms and transactions on the other hand, including blurring that follows the
enactment of new legislation (for instance, the JOBS Act and the
Crowdfunding Act). The confluence of mutual funds and private funds is an
important example of the blurring of the public / private distinction in federal
securities regulation.193
Finally, the proliferation of unconstrained mutual funds calls into
question the effectiveness of retail investor protections under the Investment
Companies Act of 1940. The author’s analysis reveals, among other things,
that UMFs share several important investment strategy and risk attributes
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 18.
Kaal & Anderson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 51.
Id. at 52.
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with private funds. These include broad authority to trade almost any type
of security, including illiquid securities; take concentrated investment risks
in individual securities, sectors, or markets; make extensive use of
derivatives; engage in short selling; and change the duration of the portfolio
without any effective limit.194 However, unlike private funds, which are
generally limited to investors who satisfy particular investment
sophistication and net worth requirements, shares of UMFs may be
purchased by retail investors, including those with quite limited or even no
investment experience.
V.

BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE
INVESTMENT FUNDS

Starting in 2015, private investment fund managers have begun to
embrace the use of blockchain technology to facilitate investment and
process optimization.195 Several private investment funds have spearheaded
the implementation of blockchain technology and smart contracting in their
business model and continue to expand it. While some funds simply focus
on trading bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to avoid market fluctuations,
others invest in and/or acquire companies that use blockchain technology to
provide synergies to their other portfolio companies. Yet others go much
further by fully automating a hedge fund secured by blockchain technology.
This is accomplished by improving the administrative procedures of private
equity deal making or using cryptocurrencies as incentives for data
scientists’ competitive models that facilitate investment analysis
efficiencies.
Several key benefits are associated with the introduction of blockchain
technology in private investment funds’ back-office administrative processes
and compliance. By automatically recording all transactions in a given
private investment fund along with any documentation or information that is
associated with a given transaction, blockchain technology reduces the
otherwise significant costs associated with human oversight in recording,
organizing, and maintain investment fund data and records. Blockchain
technology also creates a verified marketplace and provides market
participants with reliable and fully transparent data on market transactions.
The technology reduces the need for information exchange among parties
because all transactions are fully recorded and transparent. Blockchain
increases security because transactions are recorded in an immutable
194. Id. at 9.
195. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (U. of St.
Thomas Minn., Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 17-21, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033
[https://perma.cc/MX47-AA6S], at 3.
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database that ensures the validity of data and removes expensive security
procedures and labor-intensive data maintenance while reducing the need for
a paper trail. Overall, the technology allows for a significant simplification
of transactions and enormous increases in efficiency and speed of private
investment fund transactions while providing significant security
improvements.
Diversification is a key element of blockchain-based change in the
private investment fund industry. A benefit of investing in digital currencies
rather than traditional investments is that digital currencies can be immune
to the vicissitudes of traditional stock investments and the equity markets.
Although crypto investments can be just as, or more, volatile than traditional
investments, digital currencies might be used to hedge against traditional
investments.
The use of blockchain technology increases the competitive pressure in
the private investment fund industry.
Private investment funds
implementing blockchain technology are facilitating and spearheading
radical changes in financial markets. First and foremost, the structural
characteristic of blockchain as a decentralized model for financial
transactions disintermediates and disrupts the existing financial
infrastructure. Private investment funds that are first movers in the
implementation of the blockchain infrastructure systems in finance directly
contribute to that disintermediation and facilitate the accelerating evolution
of the blockchain infrastructure in finance.
The competitive pressure in the private investment fund industry
increases through operational and business efficiencies gained by those
funds that implement the technology. Most large fund advisers in the private
equity and hedge fund industry have not yet considered implementing
blockchain technology in combination with big data applications and
artificial intelligence. This, however, may change in the foreseeable future
if and when larger managers realize that their smaller competitors who utilize
these technologies gain substantial operational efficiencies and cost savings
and are able to substantially diversify their portfolio holdings via such
technologies. The threshold for change for bigger managers may be dictated
by the implementation cost of such new technologies. If and when the longterm benefits of using the technologies exceed the implementation cost,
which are much larger for larger managers than for the smaller managers
who are currently experimenting with such technologies, larger managers are
incentivized to start the innovation process as well.
The increasing use of blockchain technology in combination with
artificial intelligence and big data contributes to the market pressure on the
fee structure of private investment funds. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
the majority of private fund advisers that use blockchain technology,
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artificial intelligence, and big data in different aspects of their operations or
strategy have a substantially lower fee structure than those who do not use
them. While the overall proportion of strategies of private investment funds
that apply modern technologies, including blockchain technology, is still
small, as the use of blockchain technology grows in the private investment
fund industry, the pressure on the fee structure is likely to continue to grow.
Blockchain technology enables managers to charge per-transaction fees
which undermines the existing 2/20 fee model. Blockchain technology
facilitates a seamless and efficient calculation of management fees per
transaction. In contrast to the traditional settlement and calculation of fees
in a per-transaction model that created a prohibitive amount of work making
such operations very difficult to execute, blockchain technology overcomes
all of these restrictions. It enables the fully automated allocation of the
appropriate fee to the correct executed trade and associated client account
without any manual reconciliation or settlement. While not all blockchainenabled private investment funds charge per-transaction fees, the majority of
private fund advisers that use blockchain technology, artificial intelligence,
and big data in different aspects of their operations or strategy charge their
investors lower fees.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This Article examined the author’s scholarly contributions and
empirical findings pertaining to private investment fund regulation from
1998 to 2016, tracing the main regulatory developments in each phase since
1998. Starting with a discussion of and the implications of LTCM and
associated regulatory changes since 1998, the author’s scholarly
contributions in phase one focused on evaluating the proposed remedies for
private fund investment regulation and suggesting alternatives. Evaluating
the effects of regulatory changes in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
author’s scholarship in phase two summarized the regulatory evolution of
the private fund industry and focused particularly on the evaluation of the
effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private investment fund industry.
Scholarship in phase two also analyzed the shifting evaluation of the possible
systemic risk posed by the private fund industry and pertinent developments
in private investment fund investor due diligence. The author’s scholarship
in phase three evaluated the implications of the emerging evidence of
confluence of prior separate asset classes in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank
Act and other long-term implications of the regulatory overhaul under the
Dodd-Frank-Act, such as the dilution of the public/private distinction in
federal securities regulation.
Future scholarship on private investment fund regulation will likely
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continue the existing work in the context of the effects of the Dodd-Frank
Act, and it will further the examination of evidence on confluence of the
hitherto separate asset classes (mutual funds and private funds). In
particular, comparative empirical scholarship on the different impact of the
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive in Europe and Title IV of
the Dodd-Frank Act could help clarify how and when private investment
fund managers who invest internationally and use foreign branches are
regulated and what impact such regulation across borders has on the industry.
In the confluence context, future scholarship will help ascertain the impact
of private and mutual fund confluence. Other areas of future scholarship
may include the evolution and impact of private fund investor due diligence
requirements.
The rise of blockchain technology and the prominent applications of
blockchain technology in the private investment fund industry serve as
prominent examples of the impending seismic shifts in the private
investment fund industry.
Blockchain initiatives have significant
implications for innovation in the private investment fund industry. As the
industry continues to evolve in the blockchain realm, more change is
inevitable. Legacy infrastructure upgrades via blockchain technology may
only be a first step towards crypto integration and evolution via the private
investment fund industry.

